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Abstract 
The convenience of 802.11-based wireless access 
networks has led to widespread deployment in the 
consumer, industrial and military sectors. However, 
this use is predicated on an implicit assumption 
of conﬁdentiality and availability. While the secu­
rity ﬂaws in 802.11’s basic conﬁdentially mechanisms 
have been widely publicized, the threats to network 
availability are far less widely appreciated. In fact, 
it has been suggested that 802.11 is highly suscepti­
ble to malicious denial-of-service (DoS) attacks tar­
geting its management and media access protocols. 
This paper provides an experimental analysis of such 
802.11-speciﬁc attacks – their practicality, their ef­
ﬁcacy and potential low-overhead implementation 
changes to mitigate the underlying vulnerabilities. 
1 Introduction 
The combination of free spectrum, eﬃcient 
channel coding and cheap interface hardware have 
made 802.11-based access networks extremely pop­
ular. For a couple hundred dollars a user can buy 
an 802.11 access point that seamlessly extends their 
existing network connectivity for almost 100 meters. 
As a result, the market for 802.11-based LANs ex­
ceeded $1 Billion in 2001 and includes widespread 
use in the home, enterprise and government/military 
sectors, as well as an emerging market in public area 
wireless networks. However, this same widespread 
deployment makes 802.11-based networks an attrac­
tive target for potential attackers. Indeed, recent 
research has demonstrated basic ﬂaws in 802.11’s 
encryption mechanisms [FMS01, BGW01] and au­
thentication protocols [ASJZ01] – ultimately lead­
ing to the creation of a series of protocol extensions 
and replacements (e.g., WPA, 802.11i, 802.1X) to 
address these problems. However, most of this work 
has focused primarily on the requirements of access 
control and conﬁdentiality, rather than availability. 
In contrast, this paper focuses on the threats 
posed by denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against 
802.11’s MAC protocol. Such attacks, which pre­
vent legitimate users from accessing the network, are 
a vexing problem in all networks, but they are par­
ticularly threatening in the wireless context. With­
out a physical infrastructure, an attacker is aﬀorded 
considerable ﬂexibility in deciding where and when 
to attack, as well as enhanced anonymity due to the 
diﬃculty in locating the source of individual wireless 
transmissions. Moreover, the relative immaturity of 
802.11-based network management tools makes it 
unlikely that a well-planned attack will be quickly 
diagnosed. Finally, as we will show, vulnerabilities 
in the 802.11 MAC protocol allow an attacker to se­
lectively or completely disrupt service to the network 
using relatively few packets and low power consump­
tion. 
This paper makes four principal contributions. 
First, we provide a description of vulnerabilities in 
the 802.11 management and media access services 
that are vulnerable to attack. Second, we demon­
strate that all such attacks are practical to im­
plement by circumventing the normal operation of 
the ﬁrmware in commodity 802.11 devices. Third, 
we implement two important classes of denial-of­
service attacks and investigate the range of their 
practical eﬀectiveness. Finally, we describe, imple­
ment and evaluate non-cryptographic countermea­
sures that can be implemented in the ﬁrmware of 
existing MAC hardware. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 describes related security research con­
ducted by others in academia, as well as unpub­
lished, but contemporaneous, work from the “black­
hat” security community. Section 3 describes and 
categorizes existing denial-of-service vulnerabilities 
in 802.11’s MAC protocol. In Section 4 we use live 
experiments and simulation to analyze the practical­
ity and eﬃcacy of these attacks, followed by an eval­
uation of low-overhead countermeasures to mitigate 
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the underlying vulnerabilities. Finally, we summa­
rize our ﬁndings in Section 5. 
2 Related Work 
A great deal of research has already been fo­
cused on 802.11 network security. Most of this work 
has focused on weaknesses in the wired equivalency 
protocol (WEP) intended to provide data privacy 
between 802.11 clients and access points. WEP re­
lies on shared secret keys to support a challenge-
response authentication protocol and for encrypting 
data packets. In 2001, Fluhrer et al. identiﬁed recur­
ring weak keys in WEP, and showed how to use them 
to recover the secret key [FMS01]. Once the key is 
known, an attacker can both fully utilize network 
resources and monitor the traﬃc of other network 
nodes. In a recent paper, Stubbleﬁeld et al., demon­
strate an implementation of this attack that was able 
to recover a 128-bit WEP key purely through passive 
monitoring [SIR02]. In addition, Borisov et al. have 
identiﬁed vulnerabilities that allow WEP-protected 
frames to be modiﬁed, new frames to be injected, 
authentication frames to be spoofed and plain text 
to be recovered from encrypted frames – all without 
knowing the shared secret key [BGW01]. 
While these works comprise the best known 
body of 802.11 security research, there has also been 
some attention focused on denial-of-service vulner­
abilities unique to 802.11. As part of his PhD the­
sis, Lough identiﬁes a number of security vulnera­
bilities in the 802.11 MAC protocol, including those 
that lead to the deauthentication/disassociation and 
virtual carrier-sense attacks presented in this pa­
per [Lou01]. However, while Lough’s thesis iden­
tiﬁes these vulnerabilities, it does not validate them 
empirically. We demonstrate that such validation is 
critical to assessing the true threat of such attacks. 
In addition to Lough’s work, Faria and Cheri­
ton consider the problems posed by authentication 
DoS attacks. They identify those assumption viola­
tions that lead to the vulnerabilities and propose a 
new authentication framework to address the prob­
lems [FC02]. Unlike their work, this paper focuses 
on validating the impact of the attacks and develop­
ing light-weight solutions that do not require signif­
icant changes to existing standards or extensive use 
of cryptography. 
The deauthentication/disassociation attack is 
fairly straightforward to implement and while writ­
ing this paper we discovered several in the “black 
hat” community who had done so before us. Lack­
ing publication dates it is diﬃcult to determine the 
ordering of these eﬀorts, but we are aware of three 
implementations to date: one by Baird and Lynn 
(AirJack) presented at BlackHat Brieﬁngs in July 
of 2002, another due to Schiﬀman and presented 
at the same event (Omerta), and a tool by Floeter 
(void11) that appears to be roughly contemporae­
nous [LB02, Sch02, Flo02]. As part of his imple­
mentation, Schiﬀman also discusses a general pur­
pose toolkit, called Radiate, for injecting raw 802.11 
frames into the channel. However, since this toolkit 
works through the ﬁrmware it is only able to gener­
ate a subset of legitimate 802.11 frames. Compared 
to this previous work, our contribution lies in eval­
uating the impact of the attack, providing a cheap 
means to mitigate such attacks and in providing an 
infrastructure for mounting a wider class of attacks 
(including the virtual carrier-sense attack). 
Congestion-based MAC layer denial of service 
attacks have also been studied previously. Gupta et 
al. examined DoS attacks in 802.11 ad hoc networks 
and show that traditional wireline-based detection 
and prevention approaches do not work, and pro­
pose the use of MAC layer fairness to mitigate the 
problem [GKF02]. Kyasanur and Vaidya also look 
at congestion-based MAC DoS attacks, but from a 
general 802.11 prospective, not the purely ad hoc 
prospective [KV03]. They propose a straightforward 
method for detecting such attacks. In addition they 
propose and simulate a defense where uncompro­
mised nodes cooperate to control the frame rate at 
the compromised node. Compared to these papers, 
we focus on attacks on the 802.11 MAC protocol it­
self rather than pure resource consumption attacks. 
Finally, to provide a long-term solution to 
802.11’s security problems, the 802.11 TGi work­
ing group has proposed the standard use of the 
802.1X protocol [IEE01] for authentication in fu­
ture versions of 802.11 products, in addition to both 
short-term and long-term modiﬁcations to the pri­
vacy functions. However, while the working group 
is clearly aware of threats from unauthenticated 
management frames and spoofed control frames 
(e.g., [Abo02, Moo02]), to the best of our knowl­
edge there is no protection against such attacks in 
the current drafts under discussion. 
3 Vulnerabilities 
The 802.11 MAC layer incorporates functional­
ity uniquely designed to address problems speciﬁc 
to wireless networks. In particular, this includes 
the ability to discover networks, join and leave net­
works, and coordinate access to the radio medium. 
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 The vulnerabilities discussed in this section result 
directly from this additional functionality and can 
be broadly placed into two categories: identity and 
media-access control. 
3.1 Identity Vulnerabilities 
Identity vulnerabilities arise from the implicit 
trust 802.11 networks place in a speaker’s source 
address. As is the case with wired Ethernet hosts, 
802.11 nodes are identiﬁed at the MAC layer with 
globally unique 12 byte addresses. A ﬁeld in the 
MAC frame holds both the senders and the receivers 
addresses, as reported by the sender of the frame. 
For “class one” frames, including most management 
and control messages, standard 802.11 networks do 
not include any mechanism for verifying the correct­
ness of the self-reported identity. Consequently, an 
attacker may “spoof” other nodes and request var­
ious MAC-layer services on their behalf. This leads 
to several distinct vulnerabilities. 
3.1.1 Deauthentication 
Exemplifying this problem is the deauthentication 
attack. After an 802.11 client has selected an access 
point to use for communication, it must ﬁrst authen­
ticate itself to the AP before further communication 
may commence. Moreover, part of the authentica­
tion framework is a message that allows clients and 
access points to explicitly request deauthentication 
from one another. Unfortunately, this message it­
self is not authenticated using any keying material. 
Consequently the attacker may spoof this message, 
either pretending to be the access point or the client, 
and direct it to the other party (see Figure 1). In 
response, the access point or client will exit the au­
thenticated state and will refuse all further pack­
ets until authentication is reestablished. How long 
reestablishment takes is a function of how aggres­
sively the client will attempt to reauthenticate and 
any higher-level timeouts or backoﬀs that may sup­
press the demand for communication. By repeating 
the attack persistently a client may be kept from 
transmitting or receiving data indeﬁnitely. 
One of the strengths of this attack is its great 
ﬂexibility: an attacker may elect to deny access to 
individual clients, or even rate limit their access, in 
addition to simply denying service to the entire chan­
nel. However, accomplishing these goals eﬃciently 
requires the attacker to promiscuously monitor the 
channel and send deauthentication messages only 
when a new authentication has successfully taken 
place (indicated by the client’s attempt to associate 
with the access point). As well, to prevent a client 
Client Attacker AP 
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Authentication Response 
Association Request 
Association Response 
Deauthentication 
Data 
Deauthentication 
Figure 1: Graphical depiction of the deauthentica­
tion attack. Note that the attacker needs only gen­
erate one packet for every six exchanged between the 
client and access point. 
from “escaping” to a neighboring access point, the 
attacker must periodically scan all channels to en­
sure that the client has not switched to another over­
lapping access point. 
3.1.2 Disassociation 
A very similar vulnerability may be found in the as­
sociation protocol that follows authentication. Since 
a client may be authenticated with multiple access 
points at once, the 802.11 standard provides a spe­
cial association message to allow the client and ac­
cess point to agree which access point shall have 
responsibility for forwarding packets to and from 
the wired network on the client’s behalf. As with 
authentication, association frames are unauthenti­
cated, and 802.11 provides a disassociation message 
similar to the deauthentication message described 
earlier. Exploiting this vulnerability is functionally 
identical to the deauthentication attack. However, 
it is worth noting that the disassociation attack is 
slightly less eﬃcient than the deauthentication at­
tack. This is because deauthentication forces the 
victim node to do more work to return to the as-
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sociated state than does disassociation, ultimately 3.2 Media Access Vulnerabilities 
requiring less work on the part of the attacker. 
3.1.3 Power Saving 
The power conservation functions of 802.11 also 
present several identity-based vulnerabilities. To 
conserve energy, clients are allowed to enter a sleep 
state during which they are unable to transmit or 
receive. Before entering the sleep state the client 
announces its intention so the access point can start 
buﬀering any inbound traﬃc for the node. Occasion­
ally the client awakens and polls the access point for 
any pending traﬃc. If there is any buﬀered data 
at this time, the access point delivers it and subse­
quently discards the contents of its buﬀer. By spoof­
ing the polling message on behalf of the client, an 
attacker cay cause the access point to discard the 
clients packets while it is asleep. 
Along the same vein, it is potentially possible 
to trick the client node into thinking there are no 
buﬀered packets at the access point when in fact 
there are. The presence of buﬀered packets is indi­
cated in a periodically broadcast packet called the 
traﬃc indication map, or TIM. If the TIM message 
itself is spoofed, an attacker may convince a client 
that there is no pending data for it and the client 
will immediately revert back to the sleep state. 
Finally, the power conservation mechanisms rely 
on time synchronization between the access point 
and its clients so clients know when to awake. Key 
synchronization information, such as the period of 
TIM packets and a timestamp broadcast by the ac­
cess point, are sent unauthenticated and in the clear. 
By forging these management packets, an attacker 
can cause a client node to fall out of sync with the 
access point and fail to wake up at the appropriate 
times. 
While all of the vulnerabilities in this section 
could be resolved with appropriate authentication 
of all messages, it seems unlikely that such a capa­
bility will emerge soon. With an installed base of 
over 15 million legacy 802.11 devices, the enormous 
growth of the public-area wireless access market and 
the managerial burden imposed by the shared key 
management of 802.1X, it seems unlikely that there 
will be universal deployment of mutual authenti­
cation infrastructure any time soon. Moreover, it 
is not clear whether future versions of the 802.11 
speciﬁcation will protect management frames such 
as deauthentication (while it is clear they are aware 
of the problem, the current work of the TGi work­
ing group still leaves the deauthentication operation 
unprotected). 
802.11 networks go through signiﬁcant eﬀort to 
avoid transmit collisions. Due to hidden terminals 
perfect collision detection is not possible and a com­
bination of physical carrier-sense and virtual carrier-
sense mechanisms are employed in tandem to con­
trol access to the channel [BDSZ94]. Both of these 
mechanisms may be exploited by an attacker. 
First, to prioritize access to the radio medium 
four time windows are deﬁned. For the purposes of 
this discussion only two are important: the Short 
Interframe Space (SIFS) and the longer Distributed 
Coordination Function Interframe Space (DIFS). 
Before any frame can be sent the sending radio must 
observe a quiet medium for one of the deﬁned win­
dow periods. The SIFS window is used for frames 
sent as part of a preexisting frame exchange (for ex­
ample, the explicit ACK frame sent in response to 
a previously transmitted data frame). The DIFS 
window is used for nodes wishing to initiate a new 
frame exchange. To avoid all nodes transmitting im­
mediately after the DIFS expires, the time after the 
DIFS is subdivided into slots. Each transmitting 
node randomly and with equal probability picks a 
slot in which to start transmitting. If a collision 
does occur (indicated implicitly by the lack of an im­
mediate acknowledgment), the sender uses a random 
exponential backoﬀ algorithm before retransmitting. 
Since every transmitting node must wait at least 
an SIFS interval, if not longer, an attacker may com­
pletely monopolize the channel by sending a short 
signal before the end of every SIFS period. While 
this attack would likely be highly eﬀective, it also 
requires the attacker to expend considerable energy. 
A SIFS period is only 20 microseconds on 802.11b 
networks, leading to a duty cycle of 50,000 packets 
per second in order to disable all access to the net­
work. 
A more serious vulnerability arises from the vir­
tual carrier-sense mechanism used to mitigate col­
lisions from hidden terminals. Each 802.11 frame 
carries a Duration ﬁeld that indicates the number 
of microseconds that the channel is reserved. This 
value, in turn, is used to program the Network Al­
location Vector (NAV) on each node. Only when 
a node’s NAV reaches 0 is it allowed to transmit. 
This feature is principally used by the explicit re­
quest to send (RTS) / clear to send (CTS) hand­
shake that can be used to synchronize access to the 
channel when a hidden terminal may be interfering 
with transmissions. 
During this handshake the sending node ﬁrst 
sends a small RTS frame that includes a duration 
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Figure 2: Graphical depiction of the virtual carrier-sense attack in action. The gradient portion of the 
attacker’s frame indicates time reserved by the duration ﬁeld although no data is actually sent. Continually 
sending the attack frames back to back prevents other nodes from sending legitimate frames. 
large enough to complete the RTS/CTS sequence – 
including the CTS frame, the data frame, and the 
subsequent acknowledgment frame. The destination 
node replies to the RTS with a CTS, containing a 
new duration ﬁeld updated to account for the time 
already elapsed during the sequence. After the CTS 
is sent, every node in radio range of either the send­
ing or receiving node will have updated their NAV 
and will defer all transmissions for the duration of 
the future transaction. While the RTS/CTS fea­
ture is rarely used in practice, respecting the virtual 
carrier-sense function indicated by the duration ﬁeld 
is mandatory in all 802.11 implementations. 
An attacker may exploit this feature by assert­
ing a large duration ﬁeld, thereby preventing well-
behaved clients from gaining access to the channel 
(as shown in Figure 2). While it is possible to use 
almost any frame type to control the NAV, including 
an ACK, using the RTS has some advantages. Since 
a well-behaved node will always respond to RTS with 
a CTS, an attacker may co-opt legitimate nodes to 
propagate the attack further than it could on its 
own. Moreover, this approach allows an attacker to 
transmit with extremely low power or using a direc­
tional antennae, thereby reducing the probability of 
being located. 
The maximum value for the NAV is 32767, or 
roughly 32 milliseconds on 802.11b networks, so in 
principal an attacker need only transmit approxi­
mately 30 times a second to jam all access to the 
channel. Finally, it is worth noting that RTS, CTS 
and ACK frames are not authenticated in any cur­
rent or upcoming 802.11 standard. However, even 
if they were authenticated, this would only provide 
non-repudiation since, by design, the virtual-carrier 
sense feature impacts all nodes on the same channel. 
4 Practical Attacks and Defenses 
While the previous vulnerabilities are severe in 
principal, understanding their true threat potential 
requires evaluating the practicality of implementing 
them and how well they perform in practice. In this 
section we examine these issues as well as discussing 
the eﬃcacy of several low-overhead defense mecha­
nisms. 
4.1 802.11 Attack Infrastructure 
From a purely practical perspective, a key en­
gineering question is, “Can an attack be gener­
ated with commodity hardware?” While theoreti­
cal vulnerabilities are clearly important, we feel that 
attacks with software implementations represent a 
qualitatively greater threat since they are available 
to a dramatically expanded set of potential attack­
ers. 
At ﬁrst glance this appears to be a trivial prob­
lem since all 802.11 Network Interface Cards (NIC) 
are inherently able to generate arbitrary frames. 
However, in practice, all 802.11(a,b) devices we are 
aware of implement key MAC functions in ﬁrmware 
and moderate access to the radio through a con­
strained interface. The implementation of this 
ﬁrmware, in turn, dictates the limits of how a NIC 
can be used by an attacker. Indeed, in reviewing 
preprints of this paper, several 802.11 experts de­
clared the virtual carrier-sense attack infeasible in 
practice due to such limitations. 
In testing a wide variety of 802.11 NICs we have 
found that most allow the generation of management 
frames necessary to exploit the identity attacks de­
scribed earlier – typically using semi-documented or 
undocumented modes of operation, such as HostAP 
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Figure 3: A block diagram depicting how the “aux 
port” can be used to circumvent the limitations im­
posed by the ﬁrmware. By using this raw memory 
interface, the host can transform “normal” packets 
into arbitrary 802.11 frames as they are transmitted. 
and HostBSS mode in Intersil ﬁrmware. However, 
these same devices do not typically allow the gener­
ation of any control frames, permit other key ﬁelds 
(such as Duration and FCS) to be speciﬁed by the 
host, or allow reserved or illegal ﬁeld values to be 
transmitted. Instead, the ﬁrmware overwrites these 
ﬁelds with appropriate values after the host requests 
that queued data be transmitted. While it might 
be possible to reverse-engineer the ﬁrmware to re­
move this limitation, we believe the eﬀort to do so 
would be considerable. Instead, we have developed 
an alternative mechanism to sidestep the limitations 
imposed by the ﬁrmware interface. To understand 
our approach it is ﬁrst necessary to understand the 
architecture of existing 802.11 products. 
Most commodity 802.11 devices, including those 
using Intersil Prism, Lucent/Agere/Orinoco/Proxim 
Hermes and Cisco Aironet chipsets are based on an 
initial MAC design originated by Choice Microsys­
tems (since acquired by Intersil). In this architec­
ture, all low-level functions – including frame trans­
mission, scheduling, acknowledgement, and frag­
mentation – are implemented in ﬁrmware while 
the host is simply responsible for managing data 
transfer to and from the device. Data transfer is 
achieved through a ﬁrmware-implemented “Buﬀer 
Access Path” (BAP) that shields the driver writer 
from the details of NIC memory management and 
synchronization. While the BAP interface will typ­
ically accept raw 802.11 frames, these packets are 
then further interpreted by concurrent ﬁrmware pro­
cesses. As a result, only a subset of potential frames 
can be successfully transmitted by the host. 
However, Choice-based MACs also provide an 
unbuﬀered, unsychronized raw memory access inter­
face for debug purposes – typically called the “aux 
port”. By properly conﬁguring the host and NIC, it 
is possible to write a frame via the BAP interface, 
locate it in the NIC’s SRAM, request a transmission, 
and then modify the packet via the aux port – after 
the ﬁrmware has processed it, but before it is actu­
ally transmitted. This process is depicted in Figure 
3. To synchronize the host and NIC, a simple barrier 
can be implemented by spinning on an 802.11 header 
ﬁeld (such as duration) that is overwritten by the 
ﬁrmware. Alternatively, the host can continuously 
overwrite if synchronization is unnecessary. In prac­
tice, this “data race” approach, while undeniably 
ugly, is both reliable and permits the generation of 
arbitrary 802.11 MAC frames. Using this method we 
are able to implement any of the attacks previously 
described using oﬀ-the-shelf hardware. We believe 
we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate this capability using 
commodity equipment. 
Our prototype, called Swat,  consists of an iPAQ  
H3600 Pocket PC, running Familiar Linux, with a 
DLink DWL-650 PCMCIA 802.11 interface mounted 
in a standard PC Card sleeve. The entire device 
weighs approximately 375g (a bit over 12 oz) and 
is easily concealed in a coat pocket. More modern 
Pocket PCs, such as the Toshiba e740/e750 and the 
HP iPAQ 5450, include integral 802.11 functionally 
and could accomplish the same feats with roughly 
half the size and weight. 
To experiment with denial-of-service attacks we 
have built a demonstration application that pas­
sively monitors wireless channels for APs and clients. 
Individual clients are identiﬁed initially by their 
MAC address, but as they generate traﬃc, a cus­
tom DNS resolver and a slightly modiﬁed version of 
dsniﬀ [Son] is used to isolate better identiﬁers (e.g., 
userids, DNS address of IMAP server, etc). These 
identiﬁers can be used to select individual hosts for 
attack, or all hosts may be attacked en masse. The 
application and the actual device are pictured in Fig­
ure 4. 
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the 
impact of the deauthentication attack and a pre­
liminary defense mechanism, followed by a similar 
examination of the virtual carrier-sense attack and 
defense. 
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Figure 4: iPAQ H3600 with Dlink DWL-650 card, 
running Swat attack testing tool. Individual clients 
and AP’s are identiﬁed either using MAC address or 
by passively monitoring the channel and extracting 
destination IP addresses and DNS names. 
4.2 Deauthentication Attack 
Our implementation of this attack promiscu­
ously monitors all network activity, including non-
data 802.11 frames, and matches the source and des­
tination MAC address against a list of attack tar­
gets. If a data or association response frame is re­
ceived from a target, we issue a spoofed deauthen­
tication frame to the access point on behalf of the 
client. To avoid buﬀer overﬂow in congested net­
works on the attacking machine, deauthentication 
frames are rate limited to 10 frames per second per 
client. This limit is reset when an access point ac­
knowledges receipt of a deauthentication frame. 
We tested this implementation in a small 802.11 
network composed of 7 machines: 1 attacker, 1 ac­
cess point, 1 monitoring station, and 4 legitimate 
clients. The access point was built using the Linux 
HostAP driver, which provides an in-kernel software-
based access point. Each of the clients attempted to 
transfer, via ftp, a large ﬁle through the access point 
machine – a transfer which exceeded the testing pe­
riod. We mounted two attacks on the network. The 
ﬁrst, illustrated by the thin rectangle in Figure 5, 
was directed against a single client running MacOS 
X. This client’s transfer was immediately halted, and 
even though the attack lasted less than ten seconds, 
the client did not resume transmitting at its previ­
ous rate for more than a minute. This ampliﬁcation 
was due to a combination of an extended delay while 
the client probed for other access points and the ex­
ponential backoﬀ being employed by the ftp server’s 
TCP implementation. 
The second attack, delineated by the wider rect­
angle in the same ﬁgure, was directed against all 
four clients. Service is virtually halted during this 
period, although the Windows XP client is able to 
send a number of packets successfully. This anomaly 
has two sources. First, these are not data packets 
from the ftp session but rather UDP packets used 
by Window’s DCE RPC service and not subject to 
TCP’s congestion control procedure. Second, there 
is a small race condition in our attack implementa­
tion between the time a client receives the successful 
association response and the time the attacker sends 
the deauthentication frame. The WinXP client used 
this small window to send approximately ten UDP 
packets before the attacking node shut them down. 
Modifying the implementation to send the deauthen­
tication packets after both authentication and asso­
ciation would mitigate this eﬀect. 
A number of smaller, directed attacks were per­
formed in addition to those in Figure 5. The small 
tests were done using the extended 802.11 infrastruc­
ture found at UCSD with varied victims. Recent ver­
sions of Windows, Linux, and the MacOS all gave up 
on the targeted access point and kept trying to ﬁnd 
others. Slightly older versions of the same systems 
never attempted to switch access points and were 
completely disconnected using the less sophisticated 
version of the attack. The attack even caused one 
device, an HP Jornada Pocket PC, to consistently 
crash. 
The deauthentication vulnerability can be 
solved directly by explicitly authenticating manage­
ment frames and dropping invalid requests. How­
ever, the standardization of such capabilities is still 
some ways oﬀ and it is clear that legacy MAC de­
signs do not have suﬃcient CPU capacity to im­
plement this functionality as a software upgrade. 
Therefore, system-level defenses with low-overhead 
can still oﬀer signiﬁcant value. In particular, by 
delaying the eﬀects of deauthentication or disasso­
ciation requests (e.g., by queuing such requests for 
5-10 seconds) an AP has the opportunity to observe 
subsequent packets from the client. If a data packet 
arrives after a deauthentication or disassociation re-
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Figure 5: Packets sent by each of the 4 client nodes during the deauthentication attack. The ﬁrst attack, 
against the MacOS client, started at second 15 and lasted 8 seconds. The second attack against all the clients 
started at 101 and lasted for 26 seconds. The attacking node consumes a negligible amount of bandwidth 
due to the rate limiting. 
quest is queued, that request is discarded – since a le­
gitimate client would never generate packets in that 
order. The same approach can be used in reverse 
to mitigate forged deauthentication packets sent to 
the client on behalf of the AP. This approach has 
the advantage that it can be implemented with a 
simple ﬁrmware modiﬁcation to existing NICs and 
access points, without requiring a new management 
structure. 
To test this defense we modiﬁed the access point 
used in our experiments as described above, using a 
timeout value of 10 seconds for each management 
request. We then executed the previous experiment 
again using the “hardened” access point. The equiv­
alent results can be seen in Figure 6. From this 
graph it is diﬃcult to tell that the attack is active, 
and the client nodes continue their activity oblivious 
to the misdirection being sent to the access point. 
However, our proposed solution is not without 
drawbacks. In particular, it opens up a new vulner­
ability at the moment in which mobile clients roam 
between access points. The association message is 
used to determine which AP should receive packets 
destined for the mobile client. In certain circum­
stances leaving the old association established for 
an additional period of time may prevent the rout­
ing updates necessary to deliver packets through the 
new access point. Or, in the case of an adversary, the 
association could be kept open indeﬁnitely by spoof­
ing packets from the mobile client to the spoofed AP 
– keeping the association current. While both these 
situations are possible, we will argue that they are 
unlikely to represent a new threat in practice. 
There are two main infrastructure conﬁgura­
tions that support roaming. For lack of a better 
name we refer to these as “intelligent” and “dumb”. 
In the “intelligent” conﬁguration the access points 
have an explicit means of coordination. This coordi­
nation can be used to, among other things, update 
routes for and transfer buﬀered packets between ac­
cess points when a mobile node changes associations. 
Since there is not currently a standard for this co­
ordination function, AP’s oﬀering such capabilities 
typically use proprietary protocols that work only 
between homogenous devices. In contrast “dumb” 
access points have no explicit means of coordination 
and instead rely on the underlying layer-two distri­
bution network (typically Ethernet) to reroute pack­
ets as a mobile client’s MAC address appears at a 
new AP (and hence a new Ethernet switch port). 
Intelligent infrastructures, due to their preexist­
ing coordination, are easily modiﬁed to avoid the 
aforementioned problems caused by the deassocia­
tion timeout. Since the mobile node must associate 
with the new access point before it can transmit 
data, and since the access points are coordinated 
(either directly or through a third party), the old 
access point can be informed when the mobile node 
makes a new association. Based on this informa­
tion the old access point can immediately honor the 
clients deauthentication request. While an attacker 
can spoof packets from the mobile host to create 
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Figure 6: Packets sent by each of the 4 client nodes during the deauthentication attack with an access point 
modiﬁed to defend against this attack. The ﬁrst attack, against the MacOS client, started at second 10 and 
lasted 12 seconds. The second attack against all the clients started at 30 and lasted through the end of the 
trace. The attacking node consumes a negligible amount of bandwidth due to the rate limiting. 
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confusion, this vulnerability exists without the ad­
dition of the deferred deassociation mechanisms we 
have described. 
Dumb infrastructures are slightly more problem­
atic because of their lack of coordination and reliance 
on the underlying network topology. If that under­
lying topology is a broadcast medium, which is a 
rarity these days, there is no problem because all 
packets are already delivered to all access points. If 
the underlying topology is switched, then a proto­
col is used (typically a spanning tree distribution 
protocol) to distribute which MAC addresses are 
served by which ports. Existing switches already 
gracefully support moving a MAC address from one 
port to another, but have problems when one MAC 
address is present across multiple ports. In the non­
adversarial case the mobile node will switch access 
points, proceed to send data using the new access 
point, and cease sending data through the old access 
point. From the switches perspective this is equiv­
alent to a MAC switching ports. The mobile node 
may not receive data packets until it has sent one – 
allowing the switch to learn its new port – but that 
limitation applies regardless of the deauthentication 
timeout. In the adversarial case the attacking node 
could generate spoofed traﬃc designed to confuse 
the switch. However, this does not represent a sig­
niﬁcant new vulnerability – even without the delay 
on deauthentication/disassociation an attacker can 
spoof a packet from an mobile client in order to cre­
ate this conﬂict (including a WEP protected packet 
after key recovery). 
4.3 Virtual carrier-sense attack 
Motivated by the success of the previous attack, 
we built an implementation exploiting the NAV vul­
nerability. We generated a variety of packet streams 
with a range of large duration values – including con­
tinuous runs of RTS frames, CTS frames, and ACK 
frames destined for APs, hosts and unallocated ad­
dresses. We veriﬁed that packets were being sent as 
expected using a separate machine to monitor the 
channel being targeted. To our surprise, while our 
implementation carried out the attacks faithfully, 
they did not have the expected impact. We repeated 
these experiments using both Lucent WavePoint II 
and Apple Airport Extreme access points and with a 
variety of host NIC cards, all with the same results. 
After careful examination of traces collected during 
these attacks we have come to the conclusion that 
most of the devices available to us do not properly 
implement the 802.11 MAC speciﬁcation and are im­
properly resetting their NAV. In particular, we have 
witnessed APs and NICs alike emit packets within 
a millisecond after the broadcast of a CTS frame 
with a duration of 32767. Figure 7 shows a trace 
excerpt illustrating this behavior – the initial CTS 
frame should keep the channel idle for 32ms, and 
yet after scarcely a millisecond has passed the chan­
nel is in use by another host. Such activity should 
be impossible under the 802.11 standard since nodes 
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Time Src Dest Duration Type 
(ms) 
1.294020 :00:15:01 32767 802.11 CTS 
1.295192 .10.2 .1.2 258 TCP Data 
1.296540 :ea:e7:0f 0 802.11 Ack 
1.297869 .1.2 .10.2 258 TCP Data 
1.299084 :ea:e7:0f 0 802.11 Ack 
1.300275 .1.2 .10.2 258 TCP Data 
1.300439 :ea:e7:0f 0 802.11 Ack 
1.302538 :00:15:01 32767 802.11 CTS 
1.306110 :00:15:01 32767 802.11 CTS 
1.309543 .10.2 .1.2 258 TCP Ack 
1.309810 :ea:e7:0f 0 802.11 Ack 
1.312237 .1.2 .10.2 258 TCP Data 
1.313452 :ea:e7:0f 0 802.11 Ack 
Figure 7: Excerpt from a typical virtual carrer-sense 
attack trace using CTS frames. The addresses have 
been shortened for brevity. MAC address :ea:e7:0f 
is the access point, and :00:15:01 is an unallocated 
MAC address. .1.2 is the uploading client, and .10.2 
is the receiving machine. The ﬁrst TCP data frame 
is sent 1.1 ms after a CTS that reserved the medium 
for > 32 ms. In the second CTS sequence the data 
frame is sent after 3.4 ms. 
receiving the CTS cannot assume that they will be 
able to sense the carrier (or even signiﬁcant radio 
energy) since the transmitter may be a hidden ter­
minal. We have not conducted a thorough survey of 
802.11 gear, so these deﬁciencies may be unique to 
the hardware in our environment. However, given 
the prevalence of the Choice design we would not be 
surprised if this bug is prevalent. 
Under the assumption that these bugs will be 
removed in future 802.11 products (since they eﬀec­
tively prevent RTS/CTS from working as well as the 
802.11 Point Coordinator Function and all related 
Quality-of-Service services based on 802.11) the re­
mainder of this section explores the NAV vulnerabil­
ity in the context of the popular ns simulator (which 
implements the protocol faithfully). 
We implemented the virtual carrier-sense attack 
by modifying the ns [NS] 802.11 MAC layer imple­
mentation to allow arbitrary duration values to be 
sent periodically, 30 times a second, by the attacker. 
The attacker’s frames were sent using the normal 
802.11 access timing restrictions, which was neces­
sary to prevent the attacker from excessively collid­
ing with other in-ﬂight frames (and thereby increase 
the amount of work required of the attacker). In 
addition the attacker was modiﬁed to ignore all du­
ration values transmitted from any other node. The 
network topology was chosen to mimic many existing 
802.11 infrastructure deployments: a single access 
point node, through who all traﬃc was being sent, 
18 static client nodes and 1 static attacker node, all 
within radio distance of the access point. As with 
the previous experiments, ftp was used to generate 
the long-lived network traﬃc. We simulated attacks 
using ACK frames with large duration values, as well 
as the RTS/CTS sequence described earlier. Figure 
8 shows the ACK ﬂavor of the virtual carrier-sense 
attack in action, but both provided similar results: 
the channel is completely blocked for the duration 
of the attack. 
The virtual carrier-sense attack is much harder 
to defend against in practice than the deauthentica­
tion attack. 
One approach to mitigate its eﬀects is to place a 
limit on the duration values accepted by nodes. Any 
packet containing a larger duration value is simply 
truncated to the maximum value allowable. Strict 
adherence to the required use of the NAV feature 
indicates two diﬀerent limits: a low cap and a high 
cap. The low cap has a value equal to the amount 
of time required to send an ACK frame, plus media 
access backoﬀs for that frame. The low cap is usable 
when the only packet that can follow the observed 
packet is an ACK or CTS. This includes RTS and 
all management (association, etc) frames. The high 
cap, on the other hand, is used when it is valid for a 
data packet to follow the observed frame. The limit 
in this case needs to include the time required to 
send the largest data frame, plus the media access 
backoﬀs for that frame. The high cap must be used 
in two places: when observing an ACK (because the 
ACK my be part of a MAC level fragmented packet) 
and when observing a CTS. 
We modiﬁed our simulation to add these limits, 
assuming that a value of 1500 bytes as the largest 
packet. While this is not strictly the largest packet 
that can be sent in an 802.11 network, it is the 
largest packet sent in practice because 802.11 net­
works are typically bridged to Ethernet, which has 
a roughly 1500 byte MTU. Figure 9 shows a simula­
tion of this defense under the same conditions as the 
prior simulation. While there is still signiﬁcant per­
turbation, many of the individual sessions are able 
to make successful forward progress. However, we 
found that simply by increasing the attacker’s fre­
quency to 90 packets per second, the network could 
still be shut down. This occurs because the attacker 
is using ACK frames, whose impact on the NAV is 
limited by the high cap. 
To further improve upon this result requires us 
to abandon portions of the standard 802.11 MAC 
functionality. At issue is the inherent trust that 
nodes place in the duration value sent by other 
nodes. By considering the diﬀerent frame types that 
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Figure 8: Results from the ACK based virtual carrier-sense attack simulation with 18 client nodes. The 
attack begins at time 40 and ends at time 60. The dark region at the bottom of the graph during the attack 
is the attacker. 
carry duration values we can deﬁne a new interpre­
tation of the duration that allows us to avoid most 
possible DoS attacks. The four key frame types that 
contain duration values are ACK, data, RTS, and 
CTS, and we consider each in turn. 
Under normal circumstances the only time a 
ACK frame should carry a large duration value is 
when the ACK is part of a fragmented packet se­
quence. In this case the ACK is reserving the 
medium for the next fragment. If fragmentation is 
not used then there is no reason to respect the dura­
tion value contained in ACK frames. Since fragmen­
tation is almost never used (largely due to the fact 
that default fragmentation thresholds signiﬁcantly 
exceed the Ethernet MTU) removing it from opera­
tion altogether will have minimal impact on existing 
networks. 
Like the ACK frame, the only legitimate occa­
sion a data frame can carry a large duration value is 
if it is a subframe in a fragmented packet exchange. 
Since we have removed fragmentation from the net­
work, we can safely ignore the duration values in all 
data frames. 
The third frame type to be concerned with is 
the RTS frame. The RTS frame is only valid in an 
RTS-CTS-data transmission sequence. If an RTS is 
seen on the network, it follows that the node seeing 
the RTS will also be able to observe the data frame. 
The 802.11 speciﬁcation precisely deﬁnes the time 
a CTS frame, and subsequent data frame, will be 
sent. Therefore the duration value in the RTS packet 
can be treated speculatively – respected until such 
time as a data frame should be sent. If the data 
frame is not observed at the correct time, either the 
sender has moved out of range or the RTS request 
was spoofed. In either case it is safe for the other 
node to undo the impact of this duration on the 
NAV. This interpretation is, in fact, allowed under 
the existing 802.11 standards. 
The last frame to consider is the CTS frame. If 
a lone CTS frame is observed there are two possibili­
ties: the CTS frame was unsolicited or the observing 
node is a hidden terminal. These are the only two 
cases possible, since if the observing node was not 
a hidden terminal it would have heard the original 
RTS frame and it would be handled accordingly. If 
the unsolicited CTS is addressed to a valid, in-range 
node, then only the valid node knows the CTS is 
bogus. It can prevent this attack by responding to 
such a CTS with a null function packet containing a 
zero duration value – eﬀectively undoing the attack­
ers channel reservation. However, if an unsolicited 
CTS is addressed to a nonexistent node, or a node 
out of radio range, this is indistinguishable from a 
legitimate hidden terminal. In this case, there is in­
suﬃcient information for a legitimate node to act. 
The node issuing the CTS could be an attacker, or 
they may simply be responding to a legitimate RTS 
request that is beyond the radio range of the ob­
server. 
An imperfect approach to this ﬁnal situation, is 
to allow each node to independently choose to ignore 
lone CTS packets as the fraction of time stalled on 
such requests increases. Since hidden terminals are 
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Figure 9: Results from the ACK based virtual carrier-sense attack simulation with 18 client nodes modiﬁed 
to implement defense. The attack begins at time 40 and ends at time 60. The dark region at the bottom of 
the graph during the attack is the attacker. 
a not a signiﬁcant eﬃciency problem in most net­
works (as evidenced by the fact that RTS/CTS are 
rarely employed and since the underlying functional­
ity does not seem to work in many implementations) 
setting this threshold at 30 percent, will provide nor­
mal operation in most legitimate environments, but 
will prevent an attacker from claiming more than a 
third of the bandwidth using this attack. 
It should also be noted that existing 802.11 im­
plementations use diﬀerent receive and carrier-sense 
thresholds. The diﬀerent values are such that, in 
an open area, the interference radius of a node is 
approximately double its transmit radius. In the 
hidden terminal case this means that although the 
hidden terminal can not receive the data being trans­
mitted, it still detects a busy medium and will not 
generate any traﬃc that would interfere with the 
data, so the possibility of an unsolicited CTS fol­
lowed by an undetectable data packet is very low. 
But ultimately the only foolproof solution to 
this problem is to extend explicit authentication to 
802.11 control packets. Each client-generated CTS 
packet contains an implicit claim that it was sent in 
response to a legitimate RTS generated by an ac­
cess point. However, to prove this claim, the CTS 
frame must contain a fresh and cryptographically 
signed copy of the originating RTS. If every client 
shares keying material with all surrounding access 
points it is then possible to authenticate lone CTS 
requests directly. However, such a modiﬁcation is 
a signiﬁcant alternation to the existing 802.11 stan­
dard, and it is unclear if it oﬀers suﬃcient beneﬁts 
relative to its costs. In the meantime, the system-
level defenses we have described provide reasonable 
degrees of protection with extremely low implemen­
tation overhead and no management burden. Should 
media-access based denial-of-service attacks become 
prevalent, these solutions could be deployed quickly 
with little eﬀort. 
5 Conclusion 
802.11-based networks have seen widespread de­
ployment across many ﬁelds, mainly due to the 
physical conveniences of radio-based communica­
tion. This deployment, however, was predicated in 
part on the user expectation of conﬁdentiality and 
availability. This paper addressed the availability 
aspect of that equation. We examined the 802.11 
MAC layer and identiﬁed a number of vulnerabili­
ties that could be exploited to deny service to legiti­
mate users. We described software infrastructure for 
generating arbitrary 802.11 frames using commodity 
hardware and then used this platform to implement 
versions of the deauthentication and virtual carrier-
sense attacks. We found that the former attack 
was highly eﬀective in practice, while the latter is 
only a theoretical vulnerability due to implementa­
tion deﬁciencies in commodity 802.11 gear. In addi­
tion to demonstrating the attacks, we described and 
analyzed potential countermeasures. These counter­
measures represent a stopgap measure, one that can 
be implemented with low overhead on existing hard­
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ware, but not a long term substitute for appropriate 
per-packet authentication mechanisms. Overall, we 
believe this paper helps to underscore the care that 
must be taken when deploying 802.11 networks in 
mission critical applications. 
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